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Abstract | Theodicies of satisficing – defenses of God’s goodness that justify creating minimally
satisfactory beings/worlds – originate with Robert Merrihew Adams (1972, 1979). Adams (1972)
argued that in creating imperfect beings God was graceful in giving the undeserved gift of life. There
have been many objections to Adams’s argument; e.g., Jerome A. Weinstock (1975) objected that
God still would have been graceful in granting undeserved life to superior beings, and, among others,
E. Wielenberg (2004) objected that grace doesn’t erase the imperfection of creating imperfection.
However, Adams’s theodicy arguably maintains two points: (a) non-existing superior beings cannot
be harmed by not being created, and (b) if God must create superior beings, we wouldn’t be them.
Setting aside whether God is justified in satisficing per se, I target one element of Adams’s satisficing
theodicy, viz. (b), his “non-identity” thesis: we would not be the superior beings God could have created. I argue that this thesis is inconsistent with the theology informing Adams’s theodicy. That theology identifies us not as our bodies, but as our nonphysical souls. On that theology’s “identity thesis,”
identity of subjects of experience is preserved through conception, life, death, and the after-life, and
thus is capable of preservation in alternate bodies. Thus, God could have created us as better beings in
a better world, exhibiting grace and avoiding imperfection. Thus, (b) cannot support God’s satisficing.
I entertain an objection that God could create souls whose identities vary with their bodies, but reply
that He could create souls whose identities do not vary trans-corporeally.
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A

dams’s interesting argument – that God need not
create the best, that in creating us lesser beings
God was gracious, and that we should be grateful for
the undeserved gift of life – is standardly cited as a
starting point in many arguments for or against satisficing theodicies (see, e.g., Grover 2004, Kraay 2010,
2011, Langtry 2008, Rowe 2004, Tucker 2015, van Inwagen 2015). Weinstock (1975), for example, objected to the grace component of Adams’s satisficing theodicy. Weinstock argued, among other objections, that
even if we assume grace is a virtue and its manifestation in a world w would make w superior to a world w*
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that lacked grace, God still could create a better world
x (with better beings) with greater grace simply by enabling those better beings to benefit more than the
lesser beings in w; if that makes sense, then Adams’s
assumption – that the satisficing involved in creating
lesser beings is justified by the presence of grace in a
world – would be false. It would not be what Tucker
calls “motivated suboptimization” (2015), by which he
means satisficing that is justified because it maximizes
from among sets of alternatives the optimal outcomes
available under those constraints. Wielenberg (2004)
argues along similar lines as Tucker, though not ex-

plicitly, in noting that the presence of grace in a world
alone is insufficient to justify submaximizing because,
even if Adams is right in (a), that God wrongs no
non-existing beings in failing to create them, in failing to create optimal beings in optimal worlds, God
manifests or exhibits imperfect motivational dispositions in not optimizing beings/worlds. Intuitively, if
the presence of God’s grace in a world w would make
w superior to a world w* that lacked God’s grace, then
the absence of God’s perfect motivational dispositions
in a world w would make w inferior to a world w* that
exhibited God’s perfect motivational dispositions.
(For other criticisms of Adams’s argument, see, e.g.,
Coughlan 1987, Grover 2003.).
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persons with free will in a non-cartoon-like world with
real consequences, such that our choices matter, than
we would be otherwise as automata in a cartoon-like
world, and evil and imperfection are necessary corollaries of real persons in a real world, engaged in a soteriological process or “soul-making” (Hick 1973). Hick
acknowledges, however, that while his theodicy shows
consistency between God and evil, it doesn’t justify
the extent and magnitude of apparently gratuitous suffering; thus, it fails to render plausible the idea that
they are perfectly compatible. For this, Hick admits
one must hope that the soteriological process continues into the afterlife (Hick 1973, 102-3), something
Adams also appeals to (1979, 56), but this appeal begs
the question in the context of the problem of evil, and
Notwithstanding the interesting character of these is perhaps even less plausible than the flawed generobjections, I do not wish to vet them here, as I think al theodicy it attempts to patch (Grover 2003, 161;
they may be analyzed as more relevant to (a) above, Grover 2004, 113-14).
the idea that God wrongs no non-existing beings in
failing to create them, than they are to (b) above, the Adams’s Theodicy
claim that we would not exist if those better beings
were created. I think (b) has an implicit existential, Adams’s theodicy might be thought to attempt to go
psychological, or emotional appeal – however difficult beyond the mere consistency achieved by Hick’s theit may be to characterize – that survives these ob- odicy, rendering it more coherent and, presumably,
jections, at least for those of us who prefer that we plausible, by situating it within a more comprehensive
exist than that God should have created other better explanatory framework within which created beings,
beings in better worlds, with greater grace, which instead of complaining about the extent and magnibeings would not be us. More importantly, the objec- tude of their suffering, are led to appreciate their lives
tions above, of Weinstock, Wielenberg, and others, as undeserved gifts of a gracious, loving creator. Intudo not get to the unnoticed flaw in the heart of Ad- itively, while God may have been under some morams’s argument connected with (b): the inconsistency al constraints in choosing beings and worlds (Kraay
of (b), the non-identity premise in his theodicy, with 2010), e.g., perhaps He may only engage in motivated
the identity premise in his broader theology. Though submaximization (Tucker 2015), we cannot help but
it may not worry those lacking commitments to the value our lives, and thus our very existence evidences
tenets in the broader theology, if the identity thesis is the value of satisficing, to the extent we deem that our
more plausible than the non-identity thesis within the lives are overall worth living. Adams appeals to Leib( Judeo-Christian) theology that informs Adams’s theod- niz to support the idea that our lives are worth living,
icy, then Adams’s theodicy collapses for those for whom and if anything about the evils in the past that led
it was formulated – likely the only ones who might to us changed, we would not exist, which implicitly
have been moved by it.
supports a satisficing theodicy, but he obviously does
not entirely agree with Leibniz’s views, since Adams’s
Adams’s satisficing theodicy is a response to the prob- main point is that this need not be the best possible
lem of evil within Judeo-Christian theology. The world, contra Leibniz (Adams 1979, 54-5).
problem of evil consists in the recognition that there
is a prima facie tension between:
Whereas Hick and others propose theodicies centered
i. the Judeo-Christian idea that God is all-loving
and all-powerful, and
ii. the obvious fact of the existence of massive evil
and gratuitous suffering.

Hick’s classic theodicy is that we are better off as real
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on free will within the sort of consequences-involving
world required for spiritual development, or attempt
to render coherent the idea that a morally unsurpassable being could submaximize a world (cf. Rowe 1994)
or do so with motivation (Tucker 2015), or create all
minimally acceptable worlds in one best possible mul-
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tiverse (Kraay 2010), among similar approaches, a dialectical virtue of Adams’s theodicy is that he focuses
on another reason to think God need not have created
us as better or perfect beings in a better world: we
have no legitimate claim on Him that He should have
done so, for if God were obliged to create better beings, we would not be those beings. Implicitly, to press
the claim, from Adams’s perspective, is to argue against
our own existence! (There is a self-stultifying element,
however inchoate, in that realization, which Adams
(1979, 54) attributes to Leibniz, who was much more
explicit about it.)

worlds, we wouldn’t exist.
3. By creating this imperfect world, imperfect beings
like us become possible.
4. By creating this imperfect world, God graced us
with the undeserved gift of life.

P may be credited with generating a turn in theodicy
literature that vets whether there can only be one best
possible world, infinitely many unsurpassable worlds,
or infinitely many surpassable worlds, which are a
priori or logical questions, and which of these, if any,
characterizes the actual world, which is at least partly an a posteriori or empirical question (Rowe 1979).
(For discussions of these ‘worlds’ issues, see Grover
2004, Kraay 2010, 2011, Langtry 2008, Rowe 2004,
Tucker 2015, van Inwagen 2015, Wielenberg 2004,
and Weinstock 1975.)

Call (4) and (5) Adams’s “minimally-morally-acceptable-created-being” (MMACB) criteria, implied by
(2) and (3), respectively.

Let us now consider how Adams seeks to undermine
P. Adams thinks God could create a world in which:

1. None of the individual creatures in it would exist
in the best of all possible worlds.
2. None of the creatures in it has a life that is so miserable on the whole that it would have been better
Adams sidesteps the more pressing dimension of the
for that creature if it had never existed.
problem of evil, namely, imagining a plausible, co- 3. Every individual creature in the world is at least
herent justification for gratuitous suffering. In that
as happy on the whole as it would have been in
regard, Adams’s grace argument functions, howevany other possible world in which it could have
er unwittingly, as a distraction, if not a red herring.
existed. (320)
Wielenberg (2004) implies as much when he argues
that the presence of grace does not necessarily com- Call (1)-(3) Adams’s “minimally-morally-acceptpensate for or otherwise discount the imperfection of able-world” (MMAW) criteria. Adams adduces two
satisficing. Adams, instead of directly challenging the criteria to address whether an individual being satisalleged inconsistency between a morally unsurpassa- fies MMAW-type criteria:
ble God and evil/imperfection, which is what Hick
and many other theodicists do, indirectly does so by 4. The creature is not, on the whole, so miserable that
targeting a related idea:
it would have been better off for him if he had
never existed.
(P) If a perfectly good moral agent created any
5. No being who came into existence in better or
world at all, it would have to be the very best
happier circumstances would have been the same
world that he could create. (Adams 1972, 317)
individual as the creature in question. (327)

The implicit idea in making MMAW criteria abstract is that if a world relevantly similar to ours satisfies MMAW criteria, God may satisfice in general,
though perhaps not specifically in the actual world: it
is presumably enough for an abstract satisficing theodicy if some world roughly similar to ours satisfies
MMAW criteria. This abstraction is useful to separate
two issues: whether a satisficing theodicy model case is
To situate Adams’s critique of P within the context of coherent per se, which is a version of the a priori queshis entire argument, let us sketch an abstract version tion, and whether our actual world – with its peculiar
of the argument, as follows:
array of egregious cases of gratuitous suffering – sufficiently approximates such a model world, which is
1. If there were perfect worlds with perfect beings, the a posteriori question. Whether our world matches
we would not exist in those worlds because we are up to such a possible world can be set aside, arguendo,
not perfect.
while attempting to answer the a priori question, but
2. If God were morally obliged to create those only provisionally, so long as our world conceivably
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falls within the range of nearby possible worlds that
satisfy these criteria, or within the same “cluster” of
worlds, as Kraay (2011) puts it, for if the distance between the actual world and such possible worlds is
great, then the issue of such possible worlds cannot
be used in support of a theodicy for the actual world.
And it seems intuitive that this is a surpassable world.
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similar to us might satisfy MMAW and MMACB
criteria, which we may jointly call “Adams’s satisficing criteria,” Adams adduces three cases that function
implicitly as analogies with our own case, Cases A, B,
and C. In Case A, a mother intentionally genetically alters her fetus, producing a handicapped child she
avowedly would not bring into existence without the
handicapping genetic transformation. Case B involves
One may thus reasonably resist the idea that, because a breeder capable of breeding superior beings, say,
a model-case world or world-cluster – in which a sat- puppies, who only breeds goldfish. And Case C inisficing theodicy is coherent – significantly resembles volves parents with access to genetic engineering that
the actual world, the satisficing theodicy is cogent in are not under an obligation to use it on their offspring.
the actual world. However, the main objection I develop here does not rely on resisting this model-case- Case A: the intentionally handicapped child
to-actual-world move. Adams could admit that our
world is not a model-case world without contradict- In Case A (Adams 1972, 326-29), we suppose paring his conclusion that P is false:
ents who so love their adopted handicapped children
that they want one of their own, and will not have a
(P) If a perfectly good moral agent created any
non-handicapped child, so they genetically alter their
world at all, it would have to be the very best
fetus. Adams argues that this child either would not
world that he could create. (Adams 1972, 317)
have existed, or would exist handicapped. A non-handicapped alternate would not be created, but would be
If any world satisfies MMAW criteria, regardless of more like a sibling anyway, having different genes. As
how imperfect it may be, P is false. But P would be long as the handicapped child’s life is worth living, the
false even if the penultimate highest heaven world parents did not wrong the child.
was not as perfect as the ultimate highest heaven
world, but was reasonably construed to result from Bringing this child into existence seems consistent
God’s motivated submaximization, to borrow Tuck- with Adams’s satisficing criteria, since it is plausible
er’s (2015) idea. If so, however, then showing P to be that:
false is facile, and proves little that may carry over into
a plausible satisficing theodicy for this world. Thus, (1*) This child would not exist in the best of all
there is a potentially huge gulf between a world that
possible worlds
could falsify P and significantly lower worlds that sat- (2*) This child does not have a life that is so miserable
isfy the MMAW criteria. To the extent our world saton the whole that it would have been better for it
isfies MMAW criteria, Adams’s argument applies to
if it had never existed
it, but it is not at all obvious that our world does. That (3*) This child is at least as happy on the whole as it
is, mere consistency between God and evil/imperfecwould have been in any other possible world in
tion in one very remote possible suboptimal heaven
which it could have existed
world – though arguably enough to show P is false
– is not enough to qualify the extent and magnitude These three statements are crafted as instantiations of
of evil and suffering in our world as justified satisfic- the MMAW criteria. Clearly, (2*) is equivalent to (4),
ing. Thus, Adams’s argument would fare better if some and (3*) is related to (5), which this child also arguably
model-case world or worlds that his MMAW criteria satisfies. We can imagine that (2*) or (3*) may be false
describe turn out to be closer to ours rather than re- of a particular child, but all that is needed for the armotely like it, and if the MMACB criteria are true of gument is that (1*)-(3*) and (5) be true of some such
most if not all beings in our world. That is a very tall child. Adams thinks it is intuitive that they are true of
order, but even if our world and its beings satisfy these this child. If so, Case A would support Adams’s concriteria, my objection to Adams’s non-identity thesis clusion that P is false.
undermines his argument.
Nonetheless, Case A arguably conjures the opposite
To sketch how a world similar to our own and beings intuition: by analogy, God has intentionally handDecember 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 4 | Page 118

				

icapped us, and since what the mother has done in
Case A is immoral, what God has done in handicapping us might be. Thus, Adams asks whether what’s
wrong with the parents in Case A is that they violate
the following principle (328):
(Q) It is wrong to bring into existence, knowingly, a being less excellent than one could have
brought into existence. (Adams 1972, 329)
Adams thinks Q implies P because a world containing
imperfect beings would not be a perfect world; P and
Q imply each other, for P also implies Q insofar as
a perfect world presumably contains only perfect beings. So, if God violates Q, He thereby violates P. But
Adams doesn’t think Q is morally correct; given their
equivalence relations, if Q is false, so is P. Thus, Adams
argues that Case B shows that Q is false.
Case B: the goldfish breeder
Case B (329) involves a breeder who is able to breed
superior species, but breeds goldfish, who cannot
complain that the breeder did not breed puppies,
because they would not be those puppies; nor can
non-existing puppies be harmed. Adams considers
the question: Does the breeder wrong non-existing
pups by not creating them? No, only existing beings
can be wronged. A related question is: Can the breeder transform the fish into dogs? Adams’ reply would
be that, even if this were possible in some sense, this
would produce different creatures. This conclusion accords with his non-identity thesis; Adams’s reasoning
about changes in bodies entailing changes in identity
is made more explicitly elsewhere (1979, 56), but may
be surmised from his examples here.
To make the analogy more intuitive between goldfish
and puppies, on one hand, and us and better versions
of ourselves, on the other, respectively, let us consider
beings like us, say, siblings with greater cognitive endowments. It seems obvious goldfish cannot survive as
the same beings if turned into puppies, but we might
think we can survive as the same beings if turned into
superior versions of ourselves – versions the differences between which are not like those between members
of radically different species, but more like the sorts of
differences that might obtain between siblings with
lesser and greater cognitive endowments. This makes
some sense, given how we already have ways of making piecemeal changes to ourselves without altering
December 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 4 | Page 119

				

our identity.
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Thus, if my mother got pregnant one month earlier or
later than when she got pregnant with me, then that
pregnancy would not involve the egg and sperm that
produced me, but it would produce instead someone
that would count more as a sibling (if I could, per impossibile, be imagined as existing in some abstract sense
though the egg that produced me was never inseminated): “My identity is established by my beginning. It
has been suggested that no one who was not produced
from the same individual egg and sperm cells as I was
could have been me” (Adams 1979, 56). Even identical twins, beings from the same zygote with identical
genetic material, are not the same person, numerically
– not even conjoined twins. So, any deviation from the
egg and sperm that produced me (or that specifically divided when it did into my hypothetical identical
twin) would produce something more like a sibling,
who would not be me. It follows we cannot complain
we weren’t made as better beings, because such beings
wouldn’t be us. If better beings were required to be
created, we would not exist – they would. This conclusion supports the implications of Cases A and B.
If this does not reveal the violation of Q to be the
problem with Case A, then what is? To answer this
question, Adams turns to Case C (Adams 1972, 32930).
Case C: genetically engineering our children
The atheist objects that if God exists, He’d have made
us, and the world, better. Given God’s attributes, He
should have, but His not doing so contradicts His
omnibenevolence. Case C involves the parental availability of genetic engineering, which Adams claims
nobody is obliged to use. If we fail to use it to enhance our offspring, we clearly violate Q. But thinking
carefully about Case C suggests that it’s obviously not
immoral to refuse to genetically engineer our children. In fact, it seems to be a prima facie case that it is
more obviously morally permissible not to genetically
engineer our children than it is morally permissible
to genetically engineer them. If this is correct, Adams
implies, Q is false. If Q is false, that would seem to
vindicate God for not creating us as the best versions
of ourselves while still being who we are, by divine
means analogous to genetic engineering, since God
does violate Q. Cases A, B, and C together show that
in creating lesser beings, God need not have wronged
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those beings, so long as they satisfy MMACB criteria
in MMAWs. Cases A-C suggest it is conceivable that
a world like ours satisfies these criteria.

a perfect being created our imperfect world; thus, appeal to beliefs that cannot engage both disputants beg
the question, and amount to preaching to the choir.

But then what does Adams think is wrong with the
parents in Case A? They have done the reverse of
genetically engineering their child, to be less than it
would have been (setting aside Adams’s insistence that
the pre- and post-genetically-altered cases are not the
same individual, an unnoticed consequence of which
is that when they altered fetus1, producing fetus2, they
killed fetus1 for the sake of fetus2). Adams claims that
what is wrong in Case A is that the parents violate R:

Additionally, the nonbeliever is not given a reason she
can recognize as valid for why God – equivalent to
the parents – is not violating a principle analogous to
R. Thus, R remains ad hoc even if it works within the
theology to which Adams appeals to support the other side of the analogy. R is ad hoc because God theoretically sets the standards for what R means regarding
deficiencies relative to ‘normal’ human beings when He
created us in this world, unlike the parents, since there
are no God-independent ‘normal’ standards against
which to compare us. Adams needs to adduce a Q-like
principle, Q*, that God does not violate, but it is unclear he can.

(R) It is wrong for human beings to cause, knowingly and voluntarily, the procreation of an offspring of human parents which is notably deficient, by comparison with normal human beings,
in mental or physical capacity. (Adams 1972, 329)

If the reversal of the analogy (applied to God) cannot
be blocked because of the asymmetry and the ad hoc
issue, then Case C becomes suspicious because it is
unclear it can apply on the other side of the analogy,
with God’s not violating some Q* in failing to make
us better beings. It makes sense for us to be leery of
genetically altering our children to improve them, but
God has no such reservations, so God is not immune
to Q*, even if we are immune to Q. Thus, showing
a case in which Q is false is as facile as adducing a
case in which P is false, but therefore does not have
the desired satisficing justification. Without the sort
of principled grounds on which to block these objections, we can object now that we could have been
made better beings, with more resilient bodies, brains,
dispositions, etc., and God could figure out a way to
do so and preserve our identities; we will make this
objection forcefully in the remainder of this paper.

R evades the question of identity in the pre- and
post-altering fetus in Case A. Adams notes that R
seems ad hoc, but emphasizes that R is consistent
with Judeo-Christian ethics. According to that theology, God was gracious in creating us lesser, undeserving beings; this is presumably like the graciousness
of parents who do not abort fetuses known to have
debilitating congenital defects. Rather than complain
about our suboptimal status, we ought to be grateful
to receive the undeserved gift of life. Thus, the religious reason Case A is reprehensible is that the parents, violating R, took matters into their own hands
and genetically reduced this potential person into one
that possibly lacks abilities requisite to enter a twoway relationship with God, violating God’s plan for
that being. (On this being God’s plan for us, see Hick
1973, 43-4.) (Again, technically, if Adams is right
about the non-identity of fetus1 and fetus2, then the While Adams has not identified what is wrong with
parents killed and sacrificed the first potential person Case A from a neutral perspective or offered reasons
to create a lesser being in its place.)
to block the analogies in Cases B and C from turning back against God, Adams can still insist Case B
Some more serious problems with Adams’s argument establishes that were God to create better beings, they
would not be us, as puppies cannot be goldfish. God is
Adams’s R-violation account carries no weight with graceful, so we should be grateful for the undeserved
nonbelievers. For the nonbeliever, this case is repre- gift of life. For Adams, following Leibniz (Adams
hensible, so it cannot be solely for a reason she cannot 1979), the question is: Are our lives worth living or
recognize. We need not articulate nonreligious moral are we better off not existing at all?
reasons that might explain what’s wrong with Case
A, but Adams must, though he doesn’t. This matters The question is: Who are we?
because Adams’s theodicy is supposed to render coherent to believers and nonbelievers alike the idea that I think the relevant question is: Were God to make
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us better beings, would they necessarily not be us? Recall Weinstock’s objection to Adams, that any world
in which God created undeserving beings would be
one in which God’s grace could manifest, not just
satisficed worlds (Weinstock 1975). Thus, God could
create perfect beings, arguably, with grace, since: any
created beings cannot exert desert claims prior to existence; thus, they would be undeserving; and, thus, by
creating them God would manifest grace. Likewise,
they may be grateful for their lives. Given that their
greater ability to benefit, which follows from their
greater perfection, outweighs our lesser ability to benefit, it seems God should have created more perfect
rather than less perfect beings. Additionally, a God
who brings into existence the greatest beings is unsurpassable in dispositions towards perfection, whereas a God who fails to bring into existence the best
possible beings would be surpassable insofar as dispositions toward ideal states of affairs are concerned,
an imperfection for which grace is not compensatory
(Wielenberg 2004, 52).
This leaves only one move for Adams’s satisficing theodicy: the idea that we would not be such beings. This
claim has a subtle existential, psychological, emotional
force insofar as we value our own lives and want it to
be us who might have been more perfect beings, or
insofar as we, believing Adams’s theodicy, are grateful
for our imperfect lives. We would likely drop the complaint, as Leibniz implies (Adams 1975), if pressing
it required God to create perfect beings but not us.
Technically, however, if the argument that God must
create better beings in a better world is cogent, but
the facts support the idea that this world and its beings are not so, then our desire to exist cannot alter
that qua objection to satisficing theodicy, despite how
contradictory it may be from some vantage defined by
our emotions and existential predicament. In other
words, the handicapped child can complain that its
parents shouldn’t have altered the fetus that produced
him, despite the fact that, if they had adhered to his
objection earlier on, he would not exist.
Adams argues that God need not have created us as
perfect beings in a perfect world because such beings
would not be us, any more than goldfish can complain that God could have made them as puppies:
God could create perfect beings or puppies, but they
wouldn’t be us or goldfish, respectively; they would be
other beings. That argument purportedly grounds the
dialectically non-neutral (theological) claim that we
December 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 4 | Page 121
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imperfect beings ought to be thankful for the gift of
life.
The question here is not about whether dogs and goldfish could share diachronic identity, nor is it “What are
identity conditions for human beings?” The question
for Adams is: What are the identity conditions for any
person within the Judeo-Christian theological system
that frames his theodicy? A central premise of Adams’
theological framework is that who we are – our true
identity from the Abrahamic theological perspective
– is not our imperfect bodies, regardless of Adams’s
(distracting) appeals to Leibniz’s unique metaphysics (Adams 1979). In Adams’s Judeo-Christian theology, who we are, essentially, is immortal souls. We
need not advance here the many arguments that have
been presented against the coherence of the concept
of an immaterial, nonphysical essence that somehow
causally interacts with our brains and bodies, how my
soul doesn’t interact with your brain, and so on. These
questions are the source of well-worn objections that
date back to ancient India (Federman 2010), where
non-orthodox philosophical schools such as Carvaka
and Buddhism challenged similar Vedic beliefs in the
ātman (soul) (Nagapriya 2004, Garfield 2015). But
these questions are unnecessary here. For even if the
soul-concept was coherent, this would not help Adams, for if who we are is souls, then God could have
given us better bodies in a better world, and we would
still be us.
This “we’re souls” objection undermines (5), the
non-identity thesis. From this perspective, there is no
way to block the inference that God violates P and
Q, and some equivalent of R that may be adduced by
extrapolation from P, Q, R, and the reasoning above,
say R*:
(R*) It is wrong for a perfect moral agent to cause,
knowingly and voluntarily, the creation of a human notably deficient by comparison with ideal
human beings in mental or physical capacity
Note that R* may be considered a non-satisficing criterion for an omnibenevolent God, unless God can
create supra-human beings with the same souls; if so,
then R* could be a satisficing criterion, and some version of it, say R**, could capture the greater requirement.
(R**) It is wrong for a perfect moral agent to

cause, knowingly and voluntarily, the creation
of a being notably deficient by comparison with
ideal beings in mental or physical capacity.
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One might argue that for the sorts of changes under
consideration (e.g., radical change of fetal genetics),
the theist can say that there are different souls in the
pre- and post-altered fetal bodies. Perhaps it is an imSince most humans appear not to be in the range of plausible or odd claim, but the theist can argue that it
ideal human beings, God violates R* in most cases; is less implausible or odd to say this than to say that
God probably violates R** in the case of most sentient the soul of a goldfish could have been in a bulldog.
beings known to us, as the animal kingdom is a rela- Unlike soul-denial, therefore, soul-difference cannot
tively ruthless hell by even human standards.
be rejected outright; thus, soul-difference deserves a
developed response.
In affording Adams a charitable interpretation, I suggested earlier that it might be enough if a neighboring Counter-reply: stem souls, and what it’s like to be a
cluster of possible worlds and possible beings satis- transubstantiated bat
fies Adams’s satisficing criteria, though actual beings
in our world may not satisfy those criteria in this or The theist can object that it seems odd to think the
that – implicitly unrepresentative – case. This accession soul of a goldfish could be the same soul as that of a
may now be retracted. For, in light of the fact that we bulldog after some sort of phi-fi (philosophical ficare supposed to be souls, God violates R* and R**, this tion) soul-body-transfer; likewise, she can object that
world contains beings the majority of which represent we could still be us in better bodies/worlds. She can
instantiations of God’s failure with respect to R* and argue that souls in radically different species could be
R**, and thus God does not even satisfy Adams’s sat- constituted differently, somewhat loosely describable
as “soul-species,” to back up that intuition. However,
isficing criteria.
while species-type differences in soul-types might be
The actual world is not neighboring some possible metaphysically possible, there is little to no basis for it
world – nor, as Kraay would put it, in a world-cluster within the theology that frames Adams’ theodicy, in
(Kraay 2011) – in which God satisfies Adams’s satis- which case it would be a transparently ad hoc emenficing criteria. As Grover argued, “unless we already dation. And while it occurs within a different theology,
have in place a robust theodicy that offers either ex- Hindu reincarnation theory rejects the intuition that
planations for or justifications of some of the world’s the soul of a goldfish cannot subsequently inhabit the
most significant evils, we have little reason to believe body of a dog or human; to the contrary, reincarnation
that this world satisfies [such] conditions” (Grover is believed to involve embodiment up and down the
2003, 146). Thus, the hedges put in place to afford evolutionary scale (Nagapriya 2004).
Adams’s satisficing argument the most charitable interpretation cannot block the fatal implications, ironically, of the idea that we are souls.
Possible replies

However, even if there are non-interchangeable
soul-species, this would not help Adams. For even
if there are non-interchangeable soul-species-based
metaphysical constraints that render it metaphysically
impossible for God to take the soul of a goldfish and
place it in the body of a dog, the variation between
ordinary and superior humans is not nearly as great as
that between goldfish and dogs, and humans all – on
this option – have human-species-souls. Thus, even
if there were non-interchangeable species-souls, presumably all members of a species could be constituted
by them, regardless of where their embodied attributes
fell along the spectrum of deficient, normal, and superior members of that species. Thus, all human-species
souls could maintain identity if placed in superior human-species bodies.

To resist this fatal “we’re souls” objection, Adams
would have to either deny the existence of the soul or
its associated identity thesis. Although the Buddhist
no-soul doctrine might be an interesting avenue to
explore, I suspect Adams would be inclined if not wiser to let go of this particular attempt at theodicy than
to let go of his belief in the soul, just as Euthyphro was
inclined, and wiser, to let go of his definition of piety
instead of his polytheism when the two were shown
by Socrates to contradict each other. If there’s no soul,
Adams’s theological framework collapses, with Hick’s
fallback afterlife position. Thus, soul-denial is not a
viable option for Adams, Hick, or like-minded theists. To block this, Adams would have to argue that each
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individual has not merely a species-soul but an individual-type soul, a unique soul identity. That means,
not just a numerically distinct human-type soul, but
a qualitatively distinct individual-type soul, a metaphysical signature above and beyond the numerical
uniqueness of being this human-souled subject of experience versus that one. But the only way that could
be cashed out would be if individual-type souls were
not qualitatively equivalent. But if we weren’t, the (unequal) differences between us would seem arbitrary,
given that they are undeserved. This might be a surmountable problem.
However, one might argue that while it is conceivable
or possible that God could make individual-souls, that
isn’t the same as God being restricted to doing so, and
there are no reasons to think He is so restricted. To the
contrary, if He could do that, He could also do this:
He could make qualitatively identical but numerically
distinct human-type souls. Within the broader dualistic metaphysics and theology that informs Adams’s
theodicy, most importantly, God is even capable of
creating what I’ll call “stem-souls,” the soul equivalents of stem cells. Like stem cells, stem-souls are
proto-type souls composed of undifferentiated soul
substance, numerically distinct but qualitatively identical until put through an individuation process and
developmental sequence in which they become qualitatively differentiated when embodied in different
psychophysical configurations (minds/bodies), only
after which they acquire soul-species-differentiated
characteristics. Such ontic essences acquire differentiation, but are otherwise equal as pure subjects of experience. If these are possible, and they seem possible
within Adams’s theological metaphysics, then it seems
Adams’s satisficing theodicy ultimately fails.
The theological metaphysics behind Adams’s theodicy is dualistic, and thus it is reasonable to think that
God, in creating a stem-soul, could make it the subject of experience, that mysterious thing about which
one might wonder what it is like to be it, such as the
experiencing subject that is a bat (Nagel 1974). If God
has the power to transubstantiate anything, such as to
convert the metaphysically mundane essence of otherwise ordinary bread into the sacred Eucharist, or
turn water molecules into wine molecules, inter alia,
then God has the power to create a stem-soul that
is the same subject of experience that could be made
into an ordinary human or into an extraordinary one,
and even into a goldfish, dog, or bat while remainDecember 2015 | Volume 2 | Issue 4 | Page 123
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ing the same subject of experience. Arguably, this is
plausible if the concept of a soul is plausible. Certain
Hindu philosophies hold that every being is eternal
stem-soul substance (the ātman) that reincarnates
and is the bearer of its previous karma. It is the same
subject of experience throughout its transmigrational
journey through countless bodies/species: some of us
may have actually known, therefore, in previous lives,
what it is like to be a bat.
Arguably, to appeal to materialist intuitions in which
identity conditions completely supervene on bodily
ones – e.g., in doubting that a goldfish mind or soul
could occupy a dog body – as a ground for rejecting
identity conditions on the soul level is, first, dialectically asymmetrical, and second, from the theological
vantage, to beg the question against God’s abilities
and against the very notion of a soul. Thus, the attempt to protect Adams’s theodicy from the failure of
his non-identity premise is at least prima facie inconsistent with the theological metaphysics that purports
to ground that theodicy: the dualist cannot consistently appeal to materialist identity criteria to defend
dualism against objections to its dualistic identity
criteria. That amounts to losing track of whether an
objection is a pro or a con, or upon whom the burden
of proof falls.

Conclusion, for theists and non-theists
I have argued that Adams’s theodicy is subject to a
number of problems, chief among them the fact that
it collapses on its own reliance on the issue of what
makes an individual who or what that individual is.
Whereas Adams thought his non-identity condition
could ground the claim that if God were required to
make better versions of us, they wouldn’t be us and
we wouldn’t exist, on analysis of the identity condition
that constitutes a central tenet of the theology within
which Adams’s theodicy is constructed, that identity
condition is the soul. Once the soul is acknowledged
as such, the rest of Adams’s satisficing theodicy of
grace unravels.
But one need not buy into the theological metaphysics of the soul to reject Adams’s non-identity thesis
and thus to reject his satisficing theodicy. For Adams’s
genetic argument about pre- and post-altering fetal
non-identity is weak even from a non-theological
vantage: if the fetus before the alteration is a subject
of experience, and remains a subject of experience

through and after the alterations, then arguably it is
the same subject of experience and thus the same being (not unlike the case in which a subject of experience remains throughout amnesia or other disruptions in its more complex sense of self ), even if its
acquired identity differs from its inherited identity.
It is a biomedical fact that fetuses have the sort of
brain activity associated with sentience fairly early on
in the first trimester. It is also a fact that organisms
in the actual world can undergo small-scale genetic
engineering while remaining subjects of experience.
Thus, not only is the answer to the a priori question
unsupportive of Adams’s generic satisficing theodicy
of grace, but simple facts about actual beings suggest
that the answer to the a posteriori question does not
support the idea that this is a MMAW or that we
are MMACBs. There may be other ways to ground
satisficing theodicies, but Adams’s non-identity thesis
is not one of them.
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